The secret American narration of the Egyptian Revolution (1) .. This is how Field Marshal Tantawi and the army managed the transitional stage
Power games are often managed behind closed doors, and the Egyptian Revolution was not the Egyptian (January) Revolution and the events that followed were an exception to that.While the apparent facts indicate that the authoritarian military exercises caused abortion of the revolutionary demands of the Egyptians for freedom and justice;Most of the details and facts witnessed in the scenes of power throughout this period remain hidden behind a huge fence of secrecy, although it still affects the lives of all Egyptians to this day.
In this context, the importance of e -messages published a few months ago from the Hillary Clinton Post, US Secretary of State who took office between January 2009 and February 2013, as by virtue of the dominant role the United States plays globally and in the East regionThe middle in particular;Clinton is an important, and effective witness in the course of events during a articulated period of modern history of Egypt.
Over the year 2011 and 2012, Clinton received regular intelligence updates on the developments of the situation in Egypt, from the outbreak of Mubarak's anti -Mubarak demonstrations and the scenes of his overthrow, through the transitional period and the interactions of the military council with the Muslim Brotherhood and revolutionary political forces, up to the first seven months, troubled and decisiveFrom the rule of the late President Mohamed Morsi, who was overthrown in a military coup in mid -2013, less than a year after his rule has passed.
The secrecy was raised from more than 35,000 of these messages in early October by a decision of the Trump administration, and was officially provided under the American Information Freedom Law, and through research hundreds of news loaded with news, positions, news analyzes and intelligence reports on the Egyptian situation can be monitored, except What we should pay attention to in particular are the regular messages that have been shared with Hillary by Sydney Blumentel, and he is an American journalist who previously worked as an assistant to former President Bill Clinton, and one of Hillary's close associate 2009-2013, which is Hillary's work period in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself.
During this period, Blumentel wrote dozens of summaries from public and private sources about the developments of the situation in the Arab Spring countries, especially in Libya and Egypt, and participated with Clinton and its assistant at the time, Jake Sullivan (who was chosen by US President Joe Biden, his upcoming national security advisor) under the name "intelligence surroundings", With regard to "Egypt" specifically, "Sydney" indicated in his surroundings that the information received came from informed sources with sensitive positions at high levels in the pyramid of power in Egypt, sources in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the General Intelligence Service, and the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Office As well as American and Western intelligence officers, "Blumentel" referred to each other by name in his letters.
These messages combined a very special, and possibly special image of the developments of the situation in Egypt during that period, a picture that differs in many of its details from the prevailing convictions and images between Egyptians and Arabs and perhaps most of those familiar with the events of the Egyptian revolution in general, and while we cannot categorically assert in health It was mentioned in these messages because it is not possible to hear the narration of all its parties, it must be read very carefully due to the sensitivity and influence of the parties and the people who circulated it, especially since these messages offer a novel that may be the most detailed and complete about the scenes of events and articulated facts during the first two years of the Egyptian revolution, and we spent in "Midan" long days in sorting hundreds of messages and thousands of information and data and determining the important and dividing them in time, and we will clarify in the upcoming reports (three reports this part is the first of which) is the American special and confidential novel of the Egyptian revolution.
Mubarak's last days ... a food crisis worrying the army and the king of Saudi Arabia ensures a safe exit
The first postal message to "Blumentel" on January 29, 2011 contains an evaluation of the path of the Egyptian demonstrations that started on the 25th of the same month, in which it was indicated that the revolution is progressing quickly to the point that Mubarak has already lost, and was warned of the dire repercussions of the suppression of the uprising by forceOn the interests of the United States at the time.
The letter also put forward a set of American proposals to calm the situation, including Mubarak's announcement that he or his son will not run in the upcoming presidential entitlement, and that Washington informs the Egyptian regime that all American aid will be conditional on holding fair elections with international supervision, and that if the police and security services are involved in any actionsFather during the transitional period, the Obama administration will call for inclusive sanctions on Egypt.
The same message noted that the success of the Egyptian revolution "threatens the collapse of all American initiatives regarding the Palestinian -Israeli conflict", and that the Egyptian developments will negatively affect the American influence in the Middle East "from the Egyptian Nile to the Turkish Bosphorus Strait," warning that the grip of the United States will shake down the election of the governmentDemocracy in Egypt, a scenario described by "Blumentel" as the most optimistic scenario.
Later, another document included on January 31, a summary of a dialogue between "Blumentel" and each of Taylor Dramahler, the prestigious intelligence officer and head of the European CIA at the time, and Lang, the former American military intelligence general and whom the message described as a personal friend"Omar Suleiman", head of the General Intelligence Service, who was appointed on January 29 as Vice President.
The document monitored the field conditions of the revolution in the governorates of Alexandria and Suez, stressing that it is more hot in stages of the situation in Cairo, noting that the army wants to preserve itself, and that he does not want to be involved in a bloody conflict, and that this means that the departure of Mubarak "has become just a matter of time."
In a related context, the same document suddenly praised the existence of noticeable tensions in Mubarak's relationship with Omar Suleiman in recent months, and said that this tension is mainly due to the aspirations of the son of President Gamal Mubarak, as Mubarak had promised to give him the position of vice president 15 years ago,He never did so for fear that Solomon would succeed him, not Jamal, even though the plan was that Solomon took over the position at a time when Mubarak's son was trained.The document also indicated that the head of the General Intelligence is not popular within the army’s time, given that he is one of the intelligence first, and because he became hated by people as well.
The same document drew attention to the initial landmarks of the political transition from the army's point of view, and it can be summarized in two points: First, it is imperative that the presidency assume a general affiliated with the army, provided that the Prime Minister is a civilian person like ElBaradei or others (considering that ElBaradei does not have a real popular base.Description of the message), and secondly, it is imperative to reach understandings with the Muslim Brotherhood, who are aware that they are under the leadership of a group of moderate elites, and there are no militants, such as Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon or Khomeini in Iran.
The following message is summarized on February 2, the developments of the field conditions in Egypt during the previous days, confirming that the army is still neutral in the confrontations taking place in the street, and that those who lead the confrontation on behalf of the regime are a group of police officers and former security services, which are groups on Although it is very violent, it is not of political importance, and the message indicated a note that has not been circulated in this context, which is that Egypt has a few days before it before it enters a local food crisis, and since the army is the first responsible for the distribution of food, it will be forced To intervene and end the political predicament before he finds himself in a real popular dilemma.
The subsequent message on February 4 spoke about the repercussions of one of the articulated confrontations in the path of the Egyptian revolution, between the demonstrators in Tahrir Square and the thugs of the Mubarak regime on February 2, known in the media as the "Battle of Camel".The message said that the Egyptian army deployed more experienced units around the field to secure it, after it gave Mubarak's thugs an opportunity to "break the field", stressing that this opportunity is unlikely to be repeated.
Another briefing on February 10 is the scenes of Mubarak's last speech and his last day in power, noting that the dispute over the content of the speech between Mubarak and the military council is the reason for his delay, as Mubarak called on the Council to give him guarantees not to prejudice his person or his property after step down, and to guarantee himThe army is an honorable exit, as it was also stipulated that Omar Suleiman succeeded in power, but the army generals, led by the Minister of Defense at the time, Hussein Tantawi, and the commander of the central military region, Major General Staff of the Harb of Hassan Al -Ruwaini, opposed the appointment of Suleiman who does not belong to them.
In a later email on February 12, additional details were provided about Mubarak's last hours as president, as the mail indicated that Al -Ruwaini informed the rest of the military council members that the army would not be able to confront the demonstrators' plans to storm the Republican Palace and other governmental institutions without an expanded use of violence that would To destroy the relationship between the army and the people, which prompted Tantawi and Anan to meet Mubarak to persuade him to step down, but the two parties temporarily agreed on a compromise; It is Mubarak's transfer to his home in Sharm El -Sheikh while retaining the nominal title of President, provided that the country is managed by the vice president, but under the supervision of the Military Council.
However, Mubarak's speech on that night (February 10) left negative impressions among the angry revolutionaries about Mubarak's intentions to continue controlling the country. Otherwise, Al -Ruwaini Tantawi and Annan informed that the following day (Friday, February 11) could witness bloody confrontations between the people And the army, and that there is a remarkable sympathy within the ranks of the small officers with the demonstrators, and the General Intelligence confirmed the same estimate, which prompted Annan to meet Mubarak and asked to step down from him again, stressing that the Saudi King Abdullah pledged to ensure that he was released with sufficient personal wealth even if foreign banks freeze his accounts, And the pledge that the military council will protect its security, honor and reputation, and will ensure a decent exit, and Mubarak finally agreed to these conditions and accepted the announcement of the step that today.
On February 14, the last message to "Blumentel" presented the scenes of the military council’s deliberations about the fate of Deputy Mubarak Omar Suleiman, noting the existence of a division between the members And completely removing him from the scene, Tantawi saw that Suleiman's international contacts and his extensive relationships within the local and international security and intelligence community could be valuable, and the American message commented by saying that intelligence sources confirm that Suleiman is a challenge to the military council because his position as head of the General Intelligence has enabled him to collect sensitive information about Senior military and government officials can use it to embarrass the new government, and also confirmed that the military council does not intend to support any efforts to arrest and trial Mubarak himself, but it may allow the trial of some officials involved in corruption.
A big surprise .. Egyptian special forces participated in the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya
Some Clinton's subsequent messages revealed a major surprise about the military council's position against the revolution against the regime of the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.In an e -mail on March 1, 2011, Sydney Blumentel quoted sources that he described as "sensitive" that the military council in Egypt is strongly committed to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, saying that this commitment is linked primarily to the ancient Egyptian hostility of Gaddafi and historical disputes over oil -rich areas onThe southeastern borders of the country, as well as the Egyptians believe that their economic situation will be better in light of strong relations with any new regime in Libya.
Blumenant, quoting his high -level sources, revealed that Field Marshal Tantawi, commander of the Military Council and Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Annan, gave orders to units of the Egyptian Special Forces to start providing support to the forces fighting against the Gaddafi regime, and that some officers of these secret units have already crossed the border and held discussions with representatives of the National CouncilThe Libyan transitional on how to provide support, weapons, and even food and medical materials to the opposition forces, but Tantawi and Annan are very keen that this effort remains secret and not to leak in any way in public.
The same message confirmed that the Egyptian authorities allowed the supporters of the Transitional National Council to smuggle money across the border to support the activities opposing Gaddafi, and also indicated that the Egyptian private operations officers helped the opposition in its successful defense of the town of Zawiya (50 km west of Tripoli) in the face of the attacks of the forces loyal to Gaddafi, and it wasThey have a great virtue in many other combat successes of the opponents, noting that the Egyptian forces are working on the ground within a small difference that is hidden in the form of Libyans residing in the border areas with Egypt.
Another mail also revealed on April 8, the goals that the Military Council wanted to achieve through the Libyan conflict, and can be summarized in three main goals: First, to strengthen the Egyptian diplomatic presence in Libya, especially in the East, in which Cairo has a great influence, whereThe Egyptians wanted to help create a new Libyan political structure from the eastern region, and to enhance Egypt's position by presenting itself as a defender of the Libyan people against the regime, while it distanced itself from the Western military intervention led by the European powers with a colonial reputation.
Second, the military council was afraid that the Libyan conflict would cause a violent refugee crisis on the eastern border of Egypt if Gaddafi's forces invaded the East, so its leaders saw that supporting the demonstrators could work as an early line of defense against this crisis, in parallel, and with the Egyptian army realizing thatEast Libya is a stronghold of many violent armed groups that Gaddafi suppressed;He wanted to place these groups under observation, fearing that the conflict opened the door for the return of armed activity on the western borders of Egypt.
Finally, and perhaps the most important, Libya after Gaddafi was represented for Egypt, an invaluable economic opportunity. On the one hand, the military leaders in Cairo wanted to return the Libyan oil fields to work at the utmost speed, and to restore the country's economy to his well -being in order to bring stability to the transfers of Egyptians residing there, who were then estimated at 1.5 million Egyptians sending 254 million dollars annually, in the hope that the regime will be The new in Tripoli is more flexible and open to receiving more Egyptian labor. Otherwise, Egypt possesses strong economic interests in the eastern oil -rich in Libya, and she hoped that its participation in the conflict would give it the ability to secure and strengthen these interests.
The army chose ElBaradei .. The Brotherhood refused to appoint Al -Ganzouri
The following messages are listed by the facts of the military council administration for the transitional stage and its relationship with the various political forces after the revolution, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, an email confirms on April 7, 2011 that the Military Council began making secret contacts with the Brotherhood to discuss plans to hold parliamentary and presidential elections, and in this regard the message indicates that Tantawi believed that the relationship with the Brotherhood will help reduce the source of his real concern; He rejected the revolutionary groups that led the protests against Mubarak for any political solution that does not ensure that the military council is completely removed from the scene and the formation of a civilian government.
In the same context, the message indicated that the leaders of the military council believed that the Brotherhood was interested in obtaining a fundamental role in the rule of Egypt through a calm, organized and phase transmission from military rule to civil rule, unlike the revolutionary groups that are pressuring for a revolutionary and fast transfer, and the announcement contributedThe group at the time did not push a candidate in the presidential elections and focus on the parliamentary elections only in calming the military's concerns towards the Brotherhood.
Despite this, Tantawi has been carrying a good amount of suspicion towards the Brotherhood, to the extent that he issued instructions for military intelligence to monitor the activities of Subhi Saleh, representing the group in the Committee of Constitutional Amendments and one of the charged with it to negotiate with the Military Council, monitoring a number of prominent figures within the group Also, headed by the guide Muhammad Badi, where the leaders of the military council were concerned about the existence of contacts between the Brotherhood and some armed groups whose members obtained a wide margin of freedom after the revolution, although they suggested that the moderates in the group will control this trend for fear of granting the army an excuse to move against them. .
The following messages monitor the most advanced stages of the transitional period, and the army's efforts to manipulate various political forces.As a document indicates on November 23, one day after the resignation of the first government after the revolution led by Essam Sharaf, the leaders of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces held a secret meeting with Muhammad Al -Bradi, the former director of the Atomic Energy Agency and the most prominent "revolutionary" candidate to lead the country at the time,They offered him to assume the position of Prime Minister in an attempt to address frustration among the demonstrators who continue to collide with the army and the security forces.
According to the document, Tantawi and the leaders of the council believed that ElBaradei's political record, his international reputation at the United Nations and his independence from the army are factors that will help calm the protesters' concerns about the continuation of military rule, and at the same time foreigners and investors will be reassured about political and security stability in Egypt, but ElBaradei confirmed during these discussions.He will not accept a doll in the hands of the military council, and stressed his desire to enjoy complete freedom to form his government, and while the officers promised him to think about the matter, they confirmed that the council will remain the supreme authority in Egypt until the end of the transitional phase in 2012.
In conjunction with this, the Military Council conducted secret consultations with the Brotherhood, and according to the American messages, the army presented a level (not specified in the messages) of funding and information to the group to give them an advantage over the competing secular groups, and in return the Brotherhood provided information to the military council on the activities of the smaller and more Islamic partiesRadical.
Despite this apparent understanding, and as the messages indicate, sources related to the Egyptian General Intelligence Authority confirmed that there is a state of mutual frustration between the Brotherhood and the military council.On their part, the Brotherhood saw that the heavy errors of the military council help to increase popular support for the most radical groups, while the leadership of the military council was discretion due to the Brotherhood's failure to control the level of violence in the demonstrations of Tahrir Square, although the group was really keen to curb violence so as notThe council gives an excuse to postpone the parliamentary elections.
It appears that the secret negotiations between the army and the Al -Bradi quickly reached a dead end, as a message on November 25 indicates that the general guide of the Brotherhood Muhammad Badi and senior officials in the group received a notification from the Military Council about the intention of the council to appoint Kamal Al -Ganzouri as prime minister, AliHis main mission is to calm the street and persuade people that the military council takes steps to move to civil rule, while the military continues to enjoy absolute control over power until the end of the transitional phase.
According to the sources of the American message, the Brotherhood’s guide was not happy with the news of the appointment of Al -Janzuri, who previously worked as prime minister during the Mubarak era, due to his appointment that will increase the frustration of the revolutionaries, who will see this step back to the time of the ousted president, but Tantawi bet that the reputation of Al -Janzuri as him A hero of the poor will help reduce this congestion, but the American sources commented that this vision of Tantawi ignored that most of the demonstrators in the fields of Egypt were children when Al -Ganzouri was prime minister, and they only know about his association with Mubarak and his potential involvement in corruption during the wave of privatization of public sector companies late Only the nineties only.
The Brotherhood's vision: Egypt as an Islamic state in the Turkish style and the escalation of young army officers
The following messages are separated by the scenes of the relationship between the army and the Brotherhood, following the parliamentary elections (November 2011 - January 2012), and their vision of the state administration after winning the elections. The first message in this regard indicates, on December 4, 2011, that Field Marshal Tantawi asked his senior leaders to make a secret contact with the Brotherhood and to send an early message to the "Badi" General Guide regarding the results of the first round of the parliamentary elections (in which the Brotherhood and the Islamists achieved a comfortable victory ) The content of the message was simply that the military council would continue to control the country until the end of the transitional phase, and that any attempt to change this situation will require a decisive intervention by the army.
According to the American sources, Tantawi was concerned about the tendency of some Muslim Brotherhood leaders to work with the Salafi Al -Nour Party (Al -Nour achieved the largest percentage after the Brotherhood in the parliament elections), a tendency that came within the framework of the Brotherhood's desire to move at a faster pace towards civil rule and try to reduce the control of the army, given the view ofThe group and the light and their allies were on their way to control more than 70% of the parliament’s seats, which may tempt them to demand the formation of the interim government, especially since references such as those issued by the leading Brotherhood leaders such as Mohamed Morsi, head of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Brotherhood at the time.
However, the sources attached to the position of the Brotherhood leaders at the time indicated that Badi and many of the group's leaders felt a suspicion towards the Al -Nour Party and its president, Imad Abdel Ghafour, and they also feared that the army might move against all Islamic parties if he felt that his position was threatened.
But all of this did not prevent the Brotherhood from preparing to manage the Egyptian state after the end of the transitional phase and setting the new constitution. As a letter to "Blumentel" indicates on December 16, 2011, the sources close to the Brotherhood indicated that Badi is convinced that Heliopolis will be an Islamic state based on a model similar to the Turkish situation, with the establishment of a working relationship between the government and the army based on the foundations of Islamic law, And preparing a climate that enhances cooperation with Western companies that will have to adapt to the new situation in Egypt, with confirmation that things will not return to Mubarak's days when companies were the ones who dictate the policies of the government in Cairo.
According to the same sources;The Brotherhood began to be convinced of access to understandings with the Nour Party that allows the establishment of an Islamic government, but Badi realized that he had to walk at a reasonable pace and without urgency to avoid panic among the leading army leaders as well as Western governments, and although the group was aware that senior army leaders feltBy panic from the idea of the establishment of an Islamic government, it believed that the small officers and the middle ranks were completely supporting the Islamic system.
According to the American documents, the Brotherhood was quietly monitoring the opinions of the various classes within the army, and they were convinced that 90% of the officers would support the establishment of a system based on Islamic law, especially with regard to the issue of relations between Egypt and Israel, where the Brotherhood's polls indicated that most of the officers are not satisfied On the close relations that link them with their Israeli counterparts and their compulsion to implement strict policies against the Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip under the rule of Hamas. As for security and military cooperation with the West, the group saw that its pace will depend on the ability of these countries to accept Islamic rule in Egypt and North Africa, with no exclusion of the search for new allies, and in this context, the Brotherhood's polls indicated that Turkey may be the most ally The value of the army in the future.
Nevertheless, Mohamed Badi and most of his advisers agreed that the security services of the state should work to prevent the most extremist groups from using Egypt as a base to target Western interests in the Middle East, but some Brotherhood leaders, headed by Mohamed Morsi, saw that this vision is more dreamy, and that The new Islamic government will face an arduous task to control the activities of militant groups, especially. Secret polls of the Brotherhood have confirmed that many army officers who traveled to train in the United States have returned to Egypt, carrying a hostility towards Western society in general, and towards the American culture that they see as hostile to Islamic thought in a way Special.
For its part, American sources commented on these deliberations by saying that although Tantawi and senior army officers in Egypt have loyalty to the relationship with Washington;They believe that these leaders will not be in a position that allows them to control their forces after the new civil government took over the authority, as it is expected that they will be replaced by a new elite of the younger officers, similar to what happened in Turkey when the government put the younger officers from the supporters of the new regime in sitesLeadership instead of senior secular generals.
By the end of 2011, it seemed clear that the relationship between the army and the Brotherhood entered into an unprecedented stage of tension, as the group's leaders were convinced that the army used the demonstrations as an excuse to disrupt the transfer of power and prolong the transitional phase, but while the group was interested in calming the street to create the climate to transfer power;If its leaders confess to having a very limited impact on the revolutionary forces, and confirmed their frustration because of their inability to persuade the youth parties to reduce the level of violence in Tahrir Square.
As a briefing of "Blumentel" on December 22 of the aforementioned year;The Brotherhood was particularly upset by the young activist Islam Lutfi and the Egyptian current, which is led by young people defected from the group because of their constant attack on it and accusing it of working for the army, and the sources said that Lotfi asked his supporters to avoid any discussion with the Brotherhood, even though they transferred to these young people successive warnings about the intention of the intentionThe army used violence extensively to suppress the demonstrations.
According to the American messages, the Brotherhood believed that the expansion of violence during that period is due to the frustration that secular parties feel because of their lean performance in the parliamentary elections, and that this is the reason for their call to present the presidential elections to take place in early 2012 instead of mid -year, which is the direction of the Brotherhood -The committed to not run for the presidency until that moment- they reject it, because it will give increasing powers to the presidency at a time when the group was hoping to establish a political system dominated by Parliament.
——————————————–
