Intelligence community of occupation: structural and coordination problems
The Israeli intelligence "society" consists of the Military Intelligence Service (Aman), the General Intelligence Service (the Shin Bet), the Intelligence and Special Tasks Corporation or the Foreign Task Intelligence Agency (Mossad), the police intelligence branch, the political research center (Mamad), but it suffers fromMany gaps among them at the level of coordination where there is no joint action plan, in addition to many challenges that will be awaiting them in the next decade.These threats, some of which are unprecedented, require an accurate examination of them, and their future effects on the security of the entity.
Senior security experts in the Israeli intelligence circles consider that the most important security challenges facing "Israel" are the status of Israeli security in light of the instability of the area surrounding this entity, and the extent of the ability of the Israeli intelligence services to assess the security risks that threaten "Israel",And conducting an internal evaluation of the Jewish terrorist groups active among the settlers, the efficacy of the investigation committees by knowing the aspects of the security failures that occur in the Israeli security services, and the challenges of intelligence research implemented by these devices..
The Israeli intelligence scientist consists of three basic paths, each path is different from others.
The first track: it relates to the good collection of useful security and intelligence information, the conduct of operational research, the evaluation of the position of the opponents and the enemies who are lying in wait, and the primary goal of the path related to providing useful raw information material for decision -making circles in "Israel" at all executive levels.
The second track: it relates to the work of Israeli intelligence men themselves, including information collection units, participants in hidden wars, and those who are busy preparing the target bank.
The third track: It is the tasks carried out by the Israeli secret units to carry out security attacks within the ranks.
Recent decades have witnessed fundamental transformations in the work of the Israeli intelligence services in light of the geo-political developments, and what is related to globalization, and the disintegration of some of the surrounding countries for ethnic and national considerations, along with weaknesses that surrounded the parent countries, security considerations, social structures, and technological issues, including warsSyber and satellites.All of this led to the end of the anti -Israel groups from organizations that practice asymmetric war on gaps that can be used, and influencing them on the regional and international agenda.
These developments combined resulted in dangers at the level of Israeli security, as today it faces the danger of armed organizations and the difficulty that "Israel" and its allies objected to this, and the cyber wars of these organizations have provided new sources to collect information, and to improve their performance and use in wars.
In another field, despite clarifying all the tasks of all security services and intelligence arms, there is no accurate detail of the goals of each of them, and the nature of the performance that you must do within the framework of the political role assigned to it, and this is what drives the presentation of a number of hypotheses that are looking for the goals for whichThese devices were established, and the way they work, because the intelligence scientist consists of a traditional building, may not already fit with the size of security challenges and the strategic needs facing "Israel".
In other words, the Israeli intelligence scientist does not have a leadership, head, or manager who runs it combined, and lacks public institutions, with the exception of the committee of heads of devices, which is sometimes considered an alternative coordination body, but on the ground it lacks powers and bringing these devices to the decision to resolve.
Consequently, there is no joint plan of action in the Israel Intelligence Corporation, and there is no coordination in the field of building force between the various security services, and more than that, these constituents of the intelligence world lack the public vision, according to which the challenges before the Zionist entity are determined..
While the Military Intelligence Service "Aman" is administratively and organizationally affiliated with the head of the Israeli Army's General Staff, and the financial budget obtained by an essential part of the army budget, the Shin Bets and Mossad are directly affiliated with the Prime Minister, and their budget is an essential part of the budget of his office, and therefore it is notThere is an organizational administrative body that determines the nature of the budgets, the mechanism of their disbursement, and the areas of spending therein.This reality full of strategic challenges and security concerns would increase the level of tension between those devices, and the differences that may be ravaged by the "security vision" of the entire Hebrew entity.
And if the years of the eighties of the twentieth century have confirmed that there is no doubt that the "Israeli army" is the most central and important body in "Israel", to counter the serious security threats coming from abroad, the matter today seems very different after the qualitative decline in the value and weight of the armyAfter a series of wars that he lost or lost the elements of deterrence and decisiveness.
Therefore, there are new convictions among many Israeli circles that these security services must from a coordination body between them, which takes care of the National Security Authority from abroad, and this body is better to be from outside the "Ministry of Defense", and it can actually be achieved if there is a central administration of operationsSecurity on the one hand, and on the other hand the existence of public departments that work to regulate the performance of this coordination body.
It seems necessary to note that the Hebrew entity has been striving for Kh0 years to develop a new administrative mechanism, which is established to establish a central administration for the Israeli intelligence services, which is responsible for organizing its affairs combined, and its tasks are to take note in various aspects of the intelligence work, and to pay attention to providing the most appropriate security conditions for its work, onThat its president be directly affiliated with the Prime Minister, and is accepted by the Minister of Defense, especially since this type administration is available in the American intelligence world, and it has called for security investigation committees that were formed in "Israel".
In talking about the nature of the relationship between the reality in which Israeli security institutions are entrusted today, and the size of the desired demand, whether by the political and military level, it is possible to talk about the most prominent roles and assignments that were entrusted with the world of Israeli intelligence, and the related specifications and conditions.
Among the most prominent of these tasks:
_ Secret work in a wide front.
_ More than one Israeli security apparatus during the army's use of its live fire.
_ The Israeli security services involved in the tasks of "war on consciousness".
_ By influencing public opinion somewhere.
_ Thwarting hostile operations through the use of field tools, and detecting them by secret means.
First: General notes on intelligence imbalances and the problem of coordination in the intelligence community:
1.The form in which the challenge appeared from the battle with Hezbollah in the July a00I war to the challenge of the Palestinian resistance with the battle of "Saif Al -Quds" in May a0a1, the body of many in "Israel", especially in the intelligence and military community, a long -term change in the strength of the threat of that challenge and its transformation into a threatA dangerous stretch on Israel's security because of its intelligence capabilities and its success in determining the deadly weaknesses of the settlement assembly, and the focus of attacks on it.
a."The dilemma of the lack of chronic coordination between the security entity of the occupation entity" if it deepens beyond the study and the analysis proves the failure of the complete Israeli intelligence system, as the argument of non -coordination is considered in the opinion of those who know a thousand intelligence BThe last two decades are in favor of the resistance axis in exchange for the Israeli intelligence agent consisting of a large number of devices, departments and units, sKh% of which work on the Quds Force Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
P.The "organizational structure" of the intelligence services is flimsy, and is not appropriate enough to face the new security challenges "the state" of the occupation, because the Israeli intelligence agency is not a center, president or manager, and it does not have organizations to supervise it except for the committee of heads of the devices, which is a volunteer body that does not haveThe powers or a system of decisiveness, and as a result, the devices do not have a joint action plan, nor coordination in the field of strength structure between the various intelligence services, nor a comprehensive view of monitoring resources for these devices..
4.The difficulty in not cooperating between the Israeli intelligence services is "largely related to the lack of clarity stemming from radical problems in the National Security Service in its entirety".
Kh.The seizure of dozens of spy networks that worked for the account of "Israel" in Lebanon reflects the frictions between the Israeli intelligence services that are active in Lebanon, which are "Mossad", the Military Intelligence Division "Aman" and the "Shin Bet" public security apparatus.And that "attempts to hold a treaty to distribute work between the Israeli intelligence services have always succeeded in solving the friction between them".
I.Looking at the task of the basic military intelligence agency, which is legally defined, which is the security and intelligence work for the army and the various additional official agencies working in the field of security and external relations, and the essence of its work the strategic environment surrounding the entity.The major defect in investing the information collected in this device.While the safety apparatus is the largest intelligence apparatus in the entity, it belongs to the army and between it and the General Command of the Armed Forces.
The Army Intelligence Authority, which includes all branches working in the safety department, which is managed and chaired by the Military Intelligence Officer.This body controls the entire orbit of the information and invests it to serve the army, and it usually does not usually reach a few of the political level.
_ The Arkan Command, a specialized body that includes the army arms, in addition to the intelligence arm, which is an independent body that discusses the military decision and runs it, and only few also reach the political level..
H.If we notice the size of the responsibility and attention of military intelligence and the size of material and human resources that cost the entity to ensure its operation, the political level does not benefit from it as the Mossad and the Shin's house belonging to it and those on which they gathered together resources less than a section of the multiple military intelligence departments..
Z."Aman" is the assistance of other intelligence arms, the main "dynamo" within the Zionist intelligence system with regard to extracting and setting intelligence estimates;Being the only body to discuss all elements of intelligence estimates;This qualifies him to carry out a filtering process for it, and to provide a comprehensive national intelligence estimate, while research units in other intelligence services are setting intelligence estimates in other areas, not related to what safety does;However, in part there is a link between all research fields in all intelligence services.
s.The Research Department of the Military Intelligence Service is an independent national security apparatus: it is one of the most important circles in the Military Intelligence Service;As it draws full intelligence photos, and it provides reports on various squares, including the international arena and local squares, and its main mission is to draw the map of discounts, identify opportunities and scenarios awaiting the occupation entity, and setting an infrastructure for the Israeli executive and political response to the expected scenarios, and provides comprehensive intelligence assessmentsTo the political level within the framework of the annual evaluation, as well as in the complex events and wars, which require integration between many topics: military, political, economic, and towards all countries and organizations.Only in the research unit, a deep research is conducted towards all these issues, and the Research Department includes five leaders of central arenas, namely: the Palestinian square, the Lebanese square, and the northeastern square: Syria, Iraq, Iran, the square of the countries of the region and the great powers, and a final, technical square, practically responsibleAbout the whole world.
10."Mossad" affected the passage of time, as a secret spy device that works in "darkness" away from the limelight and outside the frameworks of legal and judicial control, many aspects of corruption, sagging and inflation, as many of its former senior officials admitted, which generated repeated calls from time to time, in particularAfter every major scandal or a catastrophic failure suffered by the "Mossad", and this leaked to the media, to the need to conduct reforms and a radical regulation of departments, structures and even the tasks and functions of the agency that is not announced the size of the budgets and money spent by the treasury of the Hebrew state, as its budget remainsAnnual, like any other Israeli intelligence services, as a secret item within the state budget...But these reforms and regulatory and structural changes that the agency needed in recent years in particular, as it was reported in numerous Israeli press reports, did not take place or on the garbage that has not been completed since the time of the eighth president of the Mossad, Danny Yatom, who was counting him a lot as a military generalPreviously prominent, in the completion of this difficult task, in light of his early resignation after less than half of his scheduled term.
11.It is noticeable and striking that the "Mossad", who is subject to its activities and its operations to strict military monitoring in Israel, is always active, especially after each scandal or a catastrophic failure whose name is related to them, in leaking information and reports to the media, sometimes by Israeli and foreign journalists "closeAnd sometimes, by former clients and officials of the device, these reports and leaked information are often characterized by the nature of "glorification with the exploits and successes" formerly attributed to the Mossad, and "defending it" in the midst of a scandal or failure of them..حتى قيل إن: "s0 في المئة من مهمات وطاقات الموساد توجه نحو جمع المعلومات، وهي عمليات سرية لا يعلم بها الجمهور.Only a small section of its activities is considered (violent) and (noisy) operations, and the failure or success of these operations puts the Mossad at the top of the titles..
1a.Despite the great concern that the "Mossad" and those in charge of it expresses the imposition of the "secret and disconnection" bases about the activities and operations of the agency, the leaks, which were made or unintentionally, allowed the formation of a specific look on the "success and failure" record of the operations it carried out"Mossad" or attributed it to stand behind its implementation.
Second: The most important causes of differences in the Israeli intelligence community:
1.The reasons that led and lead to differences, some of which are due to personal ambition and others due to the institutional reasons due to the overlapping of specializations.
a.Dagan Differences - Delmin and Kochavi (when he was responsible for military intelligence) Bardo, reflected in the lack of harmony of the Mossad and guesses of a safety device.
P.There are no clear limits for the specializations of the security services and at the same time there are no clear limits for the scope of the security of the security services.
4.The overlap of specializations led to each device seeking to exercise its authority within a range that overlaps and intersects with the scope, specializations and other devices..
Kh.The differences between the Israeli intelligence services have recently emerged clearly against the background of the guesses of these devices regarding the file of the American -Zionist differences, the file of estimating Iranian intentions, the plans of the resistance axis (the battle of Saif Al -Quds), the file of the normalization process, the Arab peace initiative file, the European -Zionist differences, and in other words, these have been conflicting.The guesses with each other, in addition to that some of them were in contrast to the directions of the Likud coalition government - Israel, our home, and with all the governments of the fragile coalitions that followed by Netanyahu and did not end with the end of the Netanyahu era, and the fixed facts indicated since the beginning of the emergence of these differences in public until the Mossad head of Dagan soughtTo play the role of the strong man within the intelligence community in a way that led to the escalation of the confrontation between him and the head of military intelligence (Aman) and the head of the Internal Security Service (Shin Beit) or the Shin Bet.
I.The "state" of the occupation entity approved the establishment of an Israeli intelligence community to form technically, not legal, the unified official institutional entity on the intelligence production process..
H.The crisis of powers and specializations has become a more complicated dimension and the data indicates that the form of balance of power between the intelligence services has been for a long time based on the considerations of geographical spatial jurisdiction:
_ “Mossad” is responsible for external intelligence activities.
_ Al -Shin Beit is responsible for internal intelligence activities, including the "state" of the occupation entity and the occupied lands.
Aman is responsible for the intelligence activities taking place in the border areas and the opponents of the "state" of the occupation entity.
Against the background of the data of the evaluation reports experience, the Israeli intelligence community was formed to allow the following:
Organizing the relationship between the Israeli intelligence services.
Organizing the relationship between the Israeli intelligence services و"السلطة التشريعية" (الكنيست).
Organizing the relationship between the Israeli intelligence services و"السلطة التنفيذية" (مجلس الوزراء).
Standardization of the course of periodic and urgent guesses.
Z. بمرور الزمن أصبح جهاز المخابرات العسكرية (أمان) يقوم ببعض الأنشطة المخابراتية الموازية لأنشطة الموساد والشين بيت، وبسبب تقاطع وتضارب الاختصاصات تم في عام 1sss، وتحديداً في فترة وزارة إيهود باراك، إنشاء لجنة خاصة لدراسة كيفية تقسيم الصلاحيات والاختصاصات بين الأجهزة، وأعقب ذلك قيام رئيس الوزراء إرييل شارون في عام a004 بتعيين دان ميريدور للقيام بالوساطة في حل أربع نزاعات كانت تدور بين أجهزة المخابرات:
Two disputes between Mossad and safety.
Two disputes between the Mossad and the Shin Beit or the Shin Bet.
The information says that Meridor, who took over the Minister of Intelligence Affairs and Atomic Energy in the Netanyahu government, has strived to resolve the differences taking place in the Israeli intelligence community..
Although the Prime Minister was directed, there was no fundamental improvement in cooperation between the Israeli intelligence services.In addition, the report prepared by the two Israeli political analysts, Amos Harril and Nashil Bfver, spoke that despite the many reports, the Israeli intelligence services are still doing more parallel activities in some areas, which made the friction between these devices a phenomenon that appears endless, and what led to conflicts, disputes and quarrelsIn addition to the long tension between Dayan and Yaldine.
s.During the fact that the head of the Shin Diskin, the head of the Shin Beit, presented his testimonies and guesses to the Council of Ministers, Benjamin Netanyahu intervened and boycotted him, asking him to keep silent and not talking about the peace process, and leaks say that the phrase Netanyahu was "... When it comes to the peace process, you must stay far ...", then Netanyahu added. "You have to focus your report on issues related to your specialty..And to understand that the diplomatic theater does not fall within the responsibility of the Shin Beit..As for Diskin, he responded to Netanyahu, saying. "..Sir, in the past we were also referring to these issues..And if you want it in a different way, it will be different..And then he stopped making testimonies for a while.The Israeli leaks reported that the reason for the problem of Netanyahu and Dissakin is due to Ozi Arad, who holds the position of National Security Adviser, and the information says that the differences of Erad are not with the president of the Shin Beit Joal Discaken, but with Mair Dagan, the Mossad president and a colloquial, the head of the safety device, and the information says that the reason for the dispute is related to the nuclear fileThe Iranian, and that the Zionist National Security Adviser, Ozi, wanted a Zionist delegation visited the American capital..Expectations indicate that he wanted to try to get rid of intelligence chiefs at that time, but the problem he faced was how to overcome General Ehud Barak, who was in charge of the defense minister and his influential role in determining the validity of the heads of the security services..