The Ethiopian border conflict - Sudanese ... the motives and fate of escalation - CAUS - Center for Arab Unity Studies

Throughout extended decades, the state of the Sudanese-Ethiopian border of about 265 km, which overlooks the four Sudanese states (Kassala, Gedaref, the Blue Nile, and Sennar), and on the provinces of Tagray and the Ethiopian Emotha, with a set of determinants, whether related to the economic advantages of the Shaqa region, Or related to the limits of the influence of the ethnic component on Ethiopia's policy towards some vital files such as the file of the foster, or those determinants related to the political and economic developments in Sudan and Ethiopia on the one hand, which are witnessing the East Africa region on the other hand..It is worth discussing, avoiding the two sides describing what the Sudanese-Ethiopian border tensions are witnessing as a border dispute that may push the two countries to enter a state of war, none of them are ready to bear its consequences..However, it seems that there is a group of internal and regional factors that have pushed towards changing Sudanese accounts in dealing with the file of the metaphor, in a way that contributed to adding more tension to Sudanese-Ethiopian relations.

Based on the foregoing, the article discusses the motives that led to the outbreak of Sudanese-Ethiopian border skirmishes, and what are the possible paths of the border crisis according to the Ethiopian accounts and its potential Sudanese counterparts.

First: The motives for the escalation of the Sudanese-Ethiopian border crisis

There is a group of motives that have stood behind the escalation of the Sudanese-Ethiopian border crisis, and its adoption of a path other than the usual path over the past decades, which can be clarified as follows:

1- The geo-economic importance of the Shafiq region

The Al -Fiqa region has great economic importance due to its economic advantages, which made it a reason for the outbreak of border conflicts over the decades between Ethiopia and Sudan;Where the fiscal area [1] has multiple rivers and waterways, in addition to its distinction with fertile agricultural lands with an area of about 600 thousand acres..The bond is divided into two parts: the first of them;The great fiscal, which is bordered to the north, to the south by the south by the sea of Islam, to the west, and the west of the Atbara River, and the majority of its inhabitants from the races of Hamran, Al -Falata and Al -Husa;The second, the minimum boundaries bordered to the north by the sea of Baslam, and to the west, Atbara River, and from the east, the Sudanese-Ethiopian border, and it is interspersed with many mountains [2].

Given the geographical and climatic nature that characterizes the fiscal area, which imposes on its lands isolation from the Sudanese territories adjacent to it during the river flooding season, in addition to the heavy rains it witnesses during the fall season, its characteristic of the heavy production of sesame, corn and short -staple cotton, along with gumArab, vegetables and fruits, the region has become coveted for Ethiopian farmers who used to settle in its territory and cultivate them with protection and support by the Ethiopian militias "lip" that resign with the silence of the Ethiopian government on its practices.

In addition to that, in light of the high population density it suffers from and the highlands and highlands of the Ethiopian border areas, the Ethiopian border areas end up in the Sudanese plains, and make the Ethiopians a permanent need to provide agricultural crops, the lack of infrastructure consisting of roads, bridges, electricity network and communications lines In support of the Sudanese movement in the region, at least during the five months in the fall season and synchronizing the rain, in addition to the small number of Sudanese population compared to their Ethiopian counterparts, created by the Ethiopians a motivation to infiltrate the lands of the foster, especially after the Sudanese rivers are running throughout the year after the construction of Sidin on the rivers Atbara and Sett [3].

2- Ethiopia and trying to impose a de facto policy

The Ethiopian and Sudanese sides have avoided the release of conflict in their description of the size and nature of tensions that are present on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border since November 2020, and in order to avoid escalation and contain the crisis, and that Addis Ababa has not previously announced that she did not recognize the demarcation of the borders between the two countries according to the general agreement 1902, and she did not request the appeal or even expressed her objection to that issue when the African Unity Organization (the African Union is currently) approved the principle of stabilizing the boundaries inherited from colonial With Eritrea, according to the Ethiopian Eritrean Border Development Committee, which is the same point where the borders of the three countries (Ethiopian, Eritrean, and Sudanese) meet, which was approved by the 1902 agreement [5], and was defined by British representative, Major Join, in the 1903 protocol and confessed to Ethiopia in the notes Mutual in 1972.

But despite the above, and unlike some political and economic challenges that the two countries have witnessed over extended decades that led them to postpone the consideration of that issue, especially in light of what is characterized by the relations between the two countries by force, it has dominated the joint consultations between the two countries, the characteristic of the Ethiopian and the Ethiopian resistanceTo place the drawing signs of the borders between the two countries.During these consultations, the ethnic determinant played a role in directing the position of the Ethiopian policy on those borders, whether during the rule of Emperor Helcelassi or Mangisto Hele Meriam belonging to the Ethiopian of the Amah, or during the reign of Abi Ahmed, who is based on the support of that ethnicity after his popularity declined with the Oromo ethnicity;The Amhara ethnic believing that it has the right in the eastern Sudanese regions [6].

Based on what was mentioned, the Ethiopian side resorted to imposing a de facto policy on the Sudanese side by placing its hand on the lands of the foster.It has in the area represented by roads, electricity lines and communications [7], and it has established 17 settlements for its farmers, 7 of which are in the "Great Food", while 10 settlements are concentrated in the "Minor Shius" [8].Over the course of extended decades, the Sudanese farmers were killed, looted and expelled from their farms at the hands of Ethiopian farmers and the militia of the lips, which was the reason for the two sides to reach mutual notes in 1972 during which Addis Ababa confessed to the signs of British actor Joe, in exchange for some obligations, the most important of them; The issue of the Ethiopian farmers in Sudan, which numbered 52 farms at that time, was resolved, in exchange for the commitment of the Ethiopian side not to increase the number of farmers in Sudan and maintain the line of discrimination between Sudanese and Ethiopian farmers inside Sudan [9], which is not committed by Addis Ababa, especially with The withdrawal of the Sudanese security and military forces from the border area in 1995 during the era of former President Omar al -Bashir, in the context of the Ethiopian barter between the waiver of the lands of the foster or the support of efforts demanding his accountability after the attempt to assassinate former Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak.

Ethiopia relied on implementing its policy to extract the lands of the Sudanese intercessor on two main mechanisms, the first of which;Ethiopia launched the hands of the Amhara elevated militias to support and protect Ethiopian farmers and infringe on Sudanese farmers, while claiming the Ethiopian government that it is not affiliated with it and cannot control it.What the militia was carrying out the attacks on the lands of the foster, which was met by Ethiopian silence, until Sudan, for the first time, accused the Ethiopian army of supporting those militias on May 28, 2020, and one of its members was killed after the Sudanese army refused to withdraw the militia quantities of the waters of the Atbara River [10].While the second of the Ethiopian mechanisms is to display economic projects in the border areas as an attempt to win the Sudanese side, such as the railway project to link the two countries that Ethiopia tried to activate its first steps in conjunction with the outbreak of the conflict in December 2020, in addition to announcing the increase in electrical connection with Sudan after the skirmishesBorder in May 2020 [11].

3- Sudan's re-consideration of the fiscal file

A group of factors behind Sudan reconsidering its calculations towards the fisherous file, coinciding with the restructuring of its policies towards a number of vital vital files with the Ethiopian side, most notably the Renaissance Dam file, in a way that contributed to adding more tension to the Sudanese-Ethiopian relations, the first of which is; The government of Abi Ahmed launched the hand of the Amhara militias in the battlefield in Tigray, unleashing its desire to restore its historical lands in the Tigray region, which was previously allocated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Tigray in the nineties of the last century, which was embodied in the militia raising banners on the roads after their control of the region wrote books. Its "Welcome to Amhara" [12], and therefore the possibility of repeating the Amhare's scenario in the Tigray region, on the lands of Sudanese intercession, which is considered from the Amhry perspective, historically, historic lands, especially in light of the settlement of the Amhara farmers on the lands of the foster for extended decades, which led to Sudanese fears of the provision of Ethiopia have escalated its fist on the lands of the foster through the Amhara militias and the imposition of "de facto policy".

As for the second factors that prompted Sudan to reconsider its accounts towards the lands of the foster;Sudan has a golden opportunity to restore its control over the lands of the foster without war and with the least possible losses, because the Ethiopian side is preoccupied with the war on the Tigray region;Whereas, the movement of Sudanese forces in November 2020 to restore its lands, in conjunction with the outbreak of the war in the Tigray region, the Ethiopian forces and their allies will disperse in the battlefield and prevent them from opening new combat fronts.Indeed, until March 2, 2021, Sudan approached the control of the last and largest strongholds of the Ethiopian militias on the lands of the foster, which is the “Burkht” area, in which at least 10,000 civilians, Ethiopian forces and armed militias are inhabited, and is one of the largest support centersThe Ethiopian Army [13], and with its liberation, Sudan recovered more than 97 percent of its territory.

As for the third factor that motivates the return of Sudanese accounts towards the lips file, it is the security challenges, as Sudan is going through a critical transitional stage facing many challenges, most notably political and security, especially related to the implementation of the Juba Sudanese peace agreement, and a number of armed militias refused to join the agreement.With the outbreak of the Tigrai region crisis and the escalation of the number of Ethiopian refugees until they reached 67 thousand in March 2021 [14], security concerns and risks escalated, whether related to its sovereignty on the lands of the intercession, or related to the rate of crime -organized crime threatening the country's security and stability, which requires taking security measuresNecessary to control the borders and address any military attacks that are likely to be exposed in the future.While the fourth factor goes to the Sudanese revolutionary situation that imposed on the government of Abdullah Hamdouk and the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, the need to work to restore Sudanese sovereignty on the lands of the foster, and to confront the attack of the Ethiopian militias, especially since the Sudanese economy is in urgent need to benefit from the advantages of economic intercession.

Second: The fate of the Sudanese-Ethiopian border crisis

After Sudan was able to impose its control and restore its sovereignty on the lands of the foster, the fate of the Sudanese-Ethiopian border crisis has receded in limited paths, depending mainly on two main elements: the first of which is, represented by possible and possible Ethiopian options to respond to Sudanese military moves in the foster, especially with Sudan's assertion inMarch 21, 2021, its rejection of any negotiations with the Ethiopian side on the re -demarcation of the border between the two countries, as well as its readiness to respond to any possible Ethiopian occupation of the lands of the foster;Second, the Sudanese plans needed to maintain their field gains.The tracks can be clarified as follows:

1- The Ethiopian obedience to Sudanese dictates in the metaphor

This scenario refers to the Ethiopian recognition of Sudan's right to exercise its sovereignty on the lands of the foster, and accept the start of the Sudanese-Ethiopian talks to demarcate the borders between the two countries according to the 1902 agreement, for several reasons: the first of them; As a way to preserve the strength and durability of relations with an Ethiopian neighboring country consistent with the regional peace path that Ethiopia started after Prime Minister Abi Ahmed assumed power in 2018, and reflected positively on its image with the international community; Second, he opened the way for Addis Ababa to win the Sudanese position in the file of the Renaissance Dam, and cut off the road for Egypt to strengthen its relations with the Sudanese neighbor; Third, the security challenges witnessed by the Ethiopian challenges after the outbreak of the war on the Tigray region, pushing the Ethiopian side to coordinate with the Sudanese neighbor if it is not to chase the leaders of the Tagray, to ensure that they do not receive Sudanese support and protection, which can be inferred by the direction of Prime Minister Abi Ahmed on March 19 / March 2021, what he described as the last warning of the Tagray leadership to surrender without announcing the potential Ethiopian reaction if they did not respond to the warning [15].

Despite the above, what weakens the possibility of translating this path, is the lack of Ethiopian political tool to resolve the file in this way, and it is not consistent with the directions of Prime Minister Abi Ahmed or with the regional weight of Ethiopia even if the reasons for the concession are logical and supportive of peaceIn its regional environment.

2- Ethiopian admission conditional on the demarcation of the borders

Among the potential tracks of the crisis is the conditional acceptance of Sudan to restore its sovereignty on the lands of the foster and end the border demarcation process in accordance with the 1902 agreement, in exchange for legalizing the conditions of Ethiopian farmers in the bond and restricting the hand of the Amhara militias, which is a repetition of the scenario itself that previously prompted the two sides to sign the 1972 notes, Which allowed Ethiopian farmers to use the advantages.

But on the other hand, this path faces several challenges, the most prominent of which is;Al -Amahr’s ethnicity refused to accept the middle of the solutions in dealing with the file of the foster, because they believed in their right to their right to it, and that the support it provided to the government of Abi Ahmed in the various files, especially during his war on the Tigray region, imposes on Abi Ahmed to adopt all possible means to enable them from the lands of the foster,Including resorting to a security and military solution, otherwise Abi Ahmed will lose his only and major supporting support during that critical stage in which the Ethiopian interior suffers instability..That is, the translation of this path depends on the extent of the commitment of the Ethiopian side of its pledges, and the procedures taken by Sudan to ensure the preservation of its field gains, and the mechanisms of response to any Ethiopian transgressions..

3- A temporary calm followed by an escalation

This path indicates the direction of the Sudanese-Ethiopian border crisis to temporary calm; To rearrange the Ethiopian accounts towards the border file on the one hand, and to reach a new curriculum in dealing with the Sudanese neighbor on the other hand, followed by a systematic Ethiopian escalation, for two main reasons: the first of which is that, as already indicated, it is not easy to accept Ethiopia and its Prime Minister with any concessions or submission For reality accounts, in a way that leads to a diminishing of its strength and hardness, whether in the Ethiopian interior or in its regional environment; The second, Abi Ahmed will not accept or lose the Amhrians after they became the only paper supporting him in the Ethiopian interior after the escalation of the voices opposing him, including between his sons (the Oromo), which makes this path the closest to reality even at the near level.

Based on the foregoing, the Ethiopian side is expected to rely on two main mechanisms in the border file, in which it will be based mainly on Sudanese weaknesses, pursuing the Sudanese "tightening" policy of whether in the field square or at the political level, in order to deplete and disperse Sudanese capabilities and weaken their forces, Especially in light of the challenges witnessed by Khartoum during its transitional phase, they can be discussed as follows:

A- The diplomatic tool

The diplomatic tool is an Ethiopian major tool to calm the crisis, and to reformulate the regional and international position on Ethiopia regarding the border file, in response to Sudan's external visits to confirm its right to exercise its sovereignty over its entire lands, which can be inferred by the statement of the Ethiopian Prime Minister AbeAhmed on March 23, 2021, stressing that Addis Ababa does not want a war with Sudan, and that Ethiopia cannot be an enemy of Sudan, and Sudan cannot be an enemy of Ethiopia..

According to this path, it is expected that Ethiopia will resort to inviting Khartoum to start long -term joint talks to demarcate the border, for two reasons: the first of which is, pushing Sudan towards accepting the table on the table Pre -2020, coinciding with the launch and completion of a number of joint economic projects as a way to win the Sudanese position towards it; The second, earned more time to rearrange the Ethiopian accounts in the field square and in coordination with its allies on the one hand, and to re -draw its image in its regional and international surroundings as a country supportive of joint cooperation with Sudan in particular, and for regional peace in general on the other hand.

B- The security tool

This tool is the backbone of the new Ethiopian approach according to this path in its dealings with Sudan; For its role in dispersing and draining the latter forces, and thus opened the way for Ethiopia to deploy its forces in the lands of the foster, especially in light of the increase in the Sudanese-Ethiopian border region, from the increase in the rate of crime, which crosses the cross-border crime in all its patterns; As the main source of financing and securing the adequacy of Ethiopian militias and their Sudanese counterpart from weapons, and thus imposing more pressure on Sudan, whether from the Sudanese interior or through its common borders with Ethiopia, which can be inferred through several indicators: the first, the multiplicity of Sudanese forces controlling quantities of Smuggled weapons across their borders that are used either to support the militias of the lips, or support the armed militias in Sudan, and thus harm the Sudanese security and stability rate in general and in the intercession in particular, the last of smuggling was on March 13, 2021 [16]; Second, the Sudanese forces arrested the commander of an Ethiopian militia, accompanied by his aides inside Sudanese territory in the foster on March 14, 2021 [17], which indicates the existence of an Ethiopian plan that Addis Ababa seeks to translate through its militias; The third of these indicators and detector for the upcoming Ethiopian plans; Sudan is accusing the Ethiopian government on March 7, of providing logistical support to the Joseph Tuka forces in the Blue Nile to enable it to control the city of Karmak close to the Sudanese-Ethiopian border [18], which is back to mind the Ethiopian scenario during the eighties and nineties of the last century when when Addis Ababa armed the Sudanese rebels, and he also warns of the possibility of Ethiopia providing more support to the various armed groups that were not signed on the Juba Sudanese Peace Agreement, as well as working to raise ethnic conflicts in a number of Sudanese regions, especially in Darfur; A way to disperse the Sudanese forces on various fronts.

In order to the above, there is a package of mechanisms that the Sudanese government is required to adopt, to preserve its field gains in the bond on the one hand, and to abort the Ethiopian attempts to deplete the Sudanese forces on the other hand: the first, the resumption of political consultations with the leaders of armed groups refusing to join the Juba peace agreement The Sudanese, including the "Toka" forces; Second, the Sudanese external visits continue to clarify the reality of the situation in the intercession and its right to exercise its sovereignty on its territory; The third is to strengthen the administrative presence of Sudan in the Al -Fasha area and develop development plans for their reconstruction and development and maximize the volume of their investments, in addition to working on the ownership of the people of the region agricultural areas that create an incentive to survive and defend their interests; Fourth, it is important to set a mechanism to control and regulate the state of social interference and integration between the tribes in some Sudanese-Ethiopian border points, without harming tribal bonding or harming Sudan's national security, in order to prevent their use as an excuse to return the skirmishes between the two sides again.

In all of the above, the Sudanese side should not depend on its field gains in the lands of the foster, and reducing the risks of potential Ethiopian policies to respond to Sudan's military moves on the one hand, and adopting a foreign policy that is different from its counterpart during the era of former President Omar al -Bashir towards a number of common vital filesWith the Ethiopian side, including the fiscal file on the other hand.There is also a golden opportunity for Egypt to deepen the Egyptian-Sudanese relations in various files;Security, military, economic, political, advocacy and health, especially in light of the Sudanese transitional government's keenness to benefit from Egyptian experiences in many files, most notably;Economic reform file.This is in addition to that Sudan is an important gateway to open up and enhance cooperation and coordination between Cairo and the countries of the continent in general, and East African countries in particular, including the Nile Basin countries, in a way that may reflect positively on the position of the latter on the Renaissance Dam file and forming a pressure factor on the Ethiopian side.

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