Sources of Soviet behavior

The political personality of the Soviet Authority, as we know, is the product of ideology and circumstances: the ideology that was inherited by the current Soviet leaders about the movement from which they rooted politically, and the conditions of the authority they have now practiced for nearly three decades in Russia.There may be a few tasks of psychoanalysis, which is more difficult than trying to track the interaction of these two powers and the relative role of each of them in determining the official Soviet behavior.However, it should be tried if we want to understand this behavior and address it effectively.

It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts that Soviet leaders reached power.The Marxist ideology has always been in the overthrow of the Russian Communist, in a remarkable development.The materials that are based on wide and complicated.However, the prominent features of the Communist thought can be summarized as it was present in 1916 as follows: (a)- that the central factor in human life, the factor that determines the nature of public life and "the features of society," is that system through which material goods are produced.And its exchange.(B)- The capital production system is a disgraceful system that inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital of the capital and is unable to develop the economic resources of society appropriately or on the fair distribution of the material goods produced by humans.(C)- Capitalism contains its self-destruction seeds, and, in light of the inability of the capital of the capital to adapt to economic change, it must eventually lead to a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class..(D)- that imperialism, the final stage of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.

The rest can be summed up in Lenin's words, in which he said, "The incompatibility of economic and political development is the flexible capitalism law.It follows that the victory of socialism may originally come in a few capitalist countries or even in one capitalist country.The victorious working class in that country, after confiscating the property of the capitalists and organizing socialist production at home, will rise against the remaining capitalist world, and attract to itself in this process the persecuted classes in other countries..[See footnote 1] It should be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism will disappear without a proletarian revolution.A final batch was needed by the revolutionary proletariat movement in order to overthrow the reeling structure.But it was inevitable that this batch would come sooner or later.

Or not

For 50 years before the outbreak of the revolution, this pattern of thinking was a great source of fascination with members of the Russian revolutionary movement.In light of their feeling of frustration, discontent and despair as a result of their inability to express self - or their patience in seeking to achieve this - within the limits of the Caesarean political system - even though they lacking wide popular support for their choice to fight a bloody revolution as a way to improve the conditions of society, these revolutionaries found in the Marxist theoryA suitable justification for their instinctive desires.[That option] has allowed them a false scientific justification for their impatience, and their categorical denial of all the virtues of the Caesarean regime, and their longing for power and revenge and their tendency to shorten the way to seek to achieve this.Therefore, it is not surprising that they implicitly believe in the truth and the validity of the Marxist -Leninist teachings, which are compatible with their motives and emotions, and that there is no need to challenge their honesty.It is an ancient phenomenon that the human nature itself.It has never been described appropriately as Edward Jibo described it in his book "The decay of the Roman Empire and its fall" where he wrote "from enthusiasm to deception, the step is fraught with dangers and a slight; the Devil of Socrates offers a vivid example of how a wise man can deceive himself, and how a man canIt is valid to deceive others, and how the conscience can lie in a mixed and medium condition between the illusion of the self and voluntary fraud..With this group of concepts, members of the Bolshevik party entered power.

At this moment, we should note that during all years of preparation for the revolution, the interest of these men, as Marx himself, did a lesser position on the future form that socialism will take [see footnote 2] of focusing on the necessary overthrow of the competing force, which [i.e. the overthrow]In their view, it should precede the application of socialism.Therefore, their views on the positive program to be implemented, as soon as the authority is obtained, was that it is mostly mysterious, ideal and impractical.With the exception of the nationalization of the industry and the confiscation of large private capital balances, there was no agreed program.The treatment of farmers, who, according to the Marxist formulation, from the proletariat, has always been a mysterious point in the pattern of communist thought, and it remained a subject of controversy and hesitation during the first ten years of communist rule.

The circumstances of the direct period that followed the revolution - that is, the existence of a civil war in Russia and foreign intervention, has made the clear truth that the Communists represent a small minority of the Russian people - made the creation of a dictatorial authority necessary.The "Military Communist" experience and the sudden attempt to eliminate private production and trade were unfortunate economic consequences and caused more discontent against the new revolutionary system.Although the temporary mitigation of the efforts to transform Russia into a Communist society, through what was known as the "New Economic Policy Program", reduced part of this economic hardship and thus its purpose, it showed that the "capitalist sector in society" was still ready to make profitImmediately from any relief of government pressure, and that it will always be formed, if it is allowed to continue, a strong opposition element of the Soviet regime and a dangerous competitor to influence in the country..This same situation applied to some extent to the individual farmer who, in his small way, was also a special product.

If Lenin remained alive for a longer period, he would have proven himself a great man enough to reconcile these conflicting powers and to achieve the final benefit of Russian society, and if this was a question of doubt.But whatever the case, Stalin and those who led them in the struggle in order to succeed the position of Lenin in the leadership, were not one of the men who tolerated the competing political forces in the field of the authority they aspire to.Their feeling of insecurity was very large.Their special natures were from fanaticism, which was not affected by any of the traditions of Anglo -Saxon compatibility, very fierce and very in ease..They carried with them, starting from the Russian -Asian world from which they emerged, doubts about the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of competing powers.After easily convinced them of their ideological "right", they insisted on subjugating or destroying all the competing forces.Outside the Communist Party, it would not have allowed any hardening in Russian society.It would not have been allowed in any way of collective human activity or associations outside the hegemony of the party.It would not have allowed any other power in Russian society to achieve vitality or integrity.The party was only the one who would have a structural structure, and everything else would be just an unlimited mass.

The same principle applies within the party.While it is permissible for the bloc of the party members in the elections, deliberations, decision -making and work, these operations are supposed to emit not of their individual will, but from the great directives of the leadership of the party and the excessive presence of the "word".

It is worth recalling again that these men may not have subject to tyranny as an end in itself.They have undoubtedly believed - and they found that it is easy to believe themselves - that only they know what is more suitable for society and that they will achieve this good once they secure their authority in an unlimited way..But in their endeavor to secure their ruling, they were not ready to accept any restrictions, whether divine or human, according to the nature of their methods.Until this security achieved, they put in a low rank in their operational priorities to achieve the amenities and happiness of the people entrusted to their care..

The most prominent characteristic of the Soviet regime is that to this day he did not witness the completion of this political consolidation process, and men in the Kremlin are still very busy with the struggle to strengthen the authority they seized in November 1917 and made it absolute authority.They sought to secure them primarily against the internal forces, within the Soviet society itself.But they also sought to secure it against the outside world.The ideology taught them, as we saw, that the outside world was hostile and that it was in the end to overthrow the political forces outside their borders..In this, they used strong Russian history and traditions to support them in this feeling.Finally, their aggressive stubbornness towards the outside world began to raise special reactions;Soon they were forced to "confront the rebellion" - in other pockets - which they raised themselves.What cannot be denied is that it is the reasons for every human being to prove himself right in the hypothesis that the world is an enemy of it;Because all that he repeated and made it justified to his behavior must be right in the end.

In the nature of the mental pattern of Soviet leaders, and in the nature of their ideology as well, it is not possible to officially recognize any opposition as a benefit or justification at all..For them, such an opposition cannot, in theory, can only come from the hostile powers of them, which are represented in the prepared capitalism..And as long as it officially admits the presence of the remains of capitalism in Russia, it can be loaded, as an internal element, part of the blame to preserve a dictatorial style of society.But with the liquidation of these remains, little by little, this justification fades, and when it was officially announced its destruction], meaning the capitalist opposition [finally, the justification disappeared completely.This fact has created one of the simplest concerns that affected the Soviet regime: since capitalism is no longer present in Russia and since it is not possible to recognize the existence of serious or wide -rangEmphasizing the danger of capitalism abroad.

This has started early.In 1924, Stalin specifically defended the preservation of the "oppression devices" represented in the army and the secret police, on the basis that "as long as there is capitalism [for the country], there will be the risk of interfering with all the consequences it carries".According to this theory, and since that time, all the internal opposition forces in Russia have been constantly depicted as agents of foreign reaction forces anti -Soviet power..

In the same context, the focus was greatly focused on the original communist thesis of the main hostility between the capitalist and socialist worlds.It is clear, through many indicators, that this focus is actually baseless.The facts related to it have been mixed with the real resentment outside the Soviet philosophy and tactics, and sometimes with great military force centers, especially the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese government in the late thirties, which had already had aggressive plans against the Soviet Union.But there is many evidence that Moscow's insistence on claiming that there is a threat to Soviet society from abroad is baseless in the reality of external hostility, but in the necessity of explaining the preservation of dictatorial authority at home.

Maintaining this pattern of Soviet power, that is, the pursuit of absolute authority at the local level, is accompanied by the promotion of what resembles the legend of the stubborn foreign hostility, has gone away in forming the actual machine of the Soviet power as we know it today.The internal institutions of the administration that did not serve this purpose died, while the institutions that served this purpose greatly flourished.The security of the Soviet Authority was built on the basis of the party's iron discipline, the intensity and spread of the secret police, and the uncomfortable economic monopoly by the state.The "repression devices," that the Soviet leaders used to secure themselves against the competing forces, to a large extent as masters for those who were designed to serve them.Today, the most important part of the Soviet Structure structure is focused on strengthening the dictatorship and preserving the concept of Russia as if it were in a siege, in the face of an enemy hiding behind the walls.So millions of people who constitute that part of the defense structure should have at any cost about this concept of Russia's position, because without it they would become unnecessary themselves..

As things seem today, rulers can no longer dream of separating these repression devices.The pursuit of absolute power, which was adopted nearly three decades ago with unparalleled (in terms of scope at least) in the modern era, produced again internally, as externally, a special reaction.The violations of the police have increased the potential opposition of the regime to what is much larger and more dangerous than it was possible before those abuses.

But at least, the rulers can dispense with the imagination through which the necessity of preserving the dictatorial authority has been defended, because this imagination has been sanctified in the Soviet philosophy through the abuses that were already committed in its name, and it is now firmly established in the structure of Soviet thought with much greater links than thatThat belongs to mere ideology.

secondly

It is a long historical background, but how does the nature of the political personality of the Soviet power explain it as we know today?

Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially eliminated.There is still a belief that capitalism is a bad system in essence and that it will inevitably collapse and that the working class (the proletariat) is obligated to help destroy it and seize power.But it is mainly confirmed by those concepts that are particularly related to the Soviet regime itself: on its location as the only real socialist system in a dark and stray world, and on the relationships of strength within it.

The first of these concepts is the innate contradiction between capitalism and socialism.We have seen what the concept has been entrenched in the foundations of Soviet power, and it involves deep repercussions in relation to Russia's behavior as a member of the international community.This means that Moscow can never assume sincerely the existence of common goals between the Soviet Union and the forces that are capitalism.Moscow must always assume that the goals of the capitalist world are hostile to the Soviet regime, and therefore hostile to the interests of the peoples that control it.And if the Soviet government puts its signature from time to time on documents indicating the opposite, then this is considered a tactical maneuver allowed in dealing with the enemy (which lacks any honor) with the necessity of caution..So the runner still exists in the first place.It is supposed, and from it many phenomena that we find are annoying in the behavior of the Kremlin in foreign policy, including confidentiality, lack of frankness, duplication, skepticism, caution and the absence of the basic ratification of achieving common goals.These phenomena will remain present in the foreseeable future, and there may be differences in their severity and focus.For example, when the Russians want something from us, they may pay one of these policy features temporarily back.When that happens, there will always be Americans jumping to the forefront with cheerful ads indicating that "the Russians have changed," and some of them will even try to attribute to themselves the credit for making such "change.".But we should not be deceived by tactical maneuvers.These characteristics that characterize the Soviet policy, such as the assumptions that stem from it are essential in the inner nature of the Soviet power, and will remain with us, whether in the forefront or in the background, until the inner nature of the Soviet power changes.

This means that we will continue for a long time in suffering difficult to deal with the Russians.This does not mean that they should be considered involved in the "Life or Death" program to topple our society on a specific date.Fortunately, the final of the final fall of capitalism suggests that there is no need to rush to this.The progress forces can take their time to prepare for the last huge coup.Meanwhile, what is essential is that the "mother socialist homeland" - and the power of the power that has already gained for socialism in the person of the Soviet Union - must be proud of and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, and its wealth must be strengthened and its enemies are disturbedAnd confuse them.The promotion of revolutionary projects "adventure" and the premature abroad, which may embarrass the Soviet authority in any way, will be an unjustified work, and even hostile to the revolution.The goal of socialism is to support and promote Soviet power, as it determines in Moscow.

This leads us to the second important concepts from the contemporary Soviet point of view, it is the infallibility of the Kremlin.The Soviet concept of power, which does not allow central organizations outside the same party, requires that the party leadership remain the only warehouse of the truth, because if the truth appears elsewhere, there will be justification to express it in an organized activity..But this is exactly what the Kremlin cannot allow and will not be allowed.

Consequently, the Communist Party leadership is always right, and it has always been right since 1929 when Stalin has made the official character to his personal authority by announcing the decisions of the political bureau unanimous..

Regarding the principle of infallibility, it is the basis on which the Iron System of the Communist Party is based.In fact, the concepts support each other, as the ideal discipline requires recognition of the infallibility, while infallibility requires observance of discipline.The two goes together to determine the behavior of the entire Soviet power apparatus.But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor is taken into account: that is, the fact that the leadership is freedom to present any specific thesis for tactical purposes if it finds it useful to the issue at any specific moment, and it requires the sincere and absolute acceptance of the thesis by the members of the movement as a whole.This means that the truth is not fixed, but it is actually innovated, for all purposes and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves, and it may change from one week to another and from month to month.There is nothing absolute and nothing fixed - nothing stems from objective reality.It is only the latest manifestation of the wisdom of those who are supposed to be worthy of absolute wisdom, because they represent the logic of history.The cumulative effect of these factors lies in imparting an irreplaceable hardness on the entire device of the Soviet Authority and giving it stability in the direction..The Kremlin alone can change this trend whenever he wants.Once a specific partisan chart was placed on a specific issue of the existing policy, the entire Soviet government machine, including its diplomatic mechanism, moves strongly along the specified path, such as a children's playing car walking in stability in a specific direction and stops only when it is intercepted by a force that cannot be overlooked.The members of this machine are disobedient for persuasion and the logic that comes from external sources.They taught them their full training of lack of confidence and excluding the superficial arguments of the outside world.Like a white dog, he sits in front of the phonographs and only hears the "voice of his master".And if they should be exempted from the tasks assigned to them the last time, it is the master who must excuse them.So no foreign official can hope to leave his words any impression of them.The most important thing that he hopes is that his words be transferred to those at the top, who are able to change the party line.But even these are not likely to be affected by any ordinary logic that may lie in the words of the bourgeois actor.Given the impossibility of any common purposes, there can be no common mental approaches.For this reason, the facts received more listening ears than the words of the Kremlin, and words have a greater weight when they are associated with a reflection episode, or support them, facts that do not accept appeal.

But we saw that the Kremlin is not under any ideological coercion to achieve its goals quickly.It is, like the Church, deals with long -term ideological concepts, and can be patient.He is not in his interest in the risk of the current achievements of the revolution for glamorous dreams in the future.Lenin's teachings require a great deal of caution and flexibility in seeking to achieve the goals of communism.It should be noted once again that these principles are immune to the lessons of Russian history: centuries of mysterious battles between the nomadic Bedouin forces along a vast and non -fortified plain, where caution, flexibility and deception are important qualities, whose value is naturally valued in the Russian or eastern mind.Consequently, the Kremlin does not show any remorse when retreating in the face of superior power.Because he is not subject to the constraints of any timetable, he does not confuse when he finds himself forced to retreat.His political activity is similar to a fluid current that moves constantly, wherever he is allowed to move, towards a specific goal, and his main concern is to make sure that every corner and corner available to him in the World Power Basin.But if he meets in a way that cannot be exceeded, then he accepts it philosophically and adapts to it, the important thing is that there is always pressure, and continuous pressure towards the desired goal.There is no trace of any feeling of Soviet psychology that this goal must be reached at any time.

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These considerations make dealing with Soviet diplomacy easier and at the same time more difficult in terms of dealing with it compared to the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders such as Napoleon and Hitler.On the other hand, it cannot be easily defeated or discharged with one victory on the part of its opponents.The careful perseverance from which its activity derives it means that it can be confronted effectively not through the sporadic actions that represent the instantaneous warnings of the democratic opinion, but only through the remote -term smart policies by the opponents of Russia - that is, through policies that are not less stable in their goals, and no less diversityAnd a capacity in its application, from the policies of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any American policy towards the Soviet Union must be the containment of the long -term Russian tendencies, and be patient, firm and vigilant..It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with the external theater: that is, with threats, screams, or excess gestures on the need of external "hardness".Although the Kremlin is essential mainly in his reaction to political facts, he does not accept prejudice to his prestige.Almost like any other government, it can be pushed through the gestures.Russian leaders are judges keen on human psychology, and therefore they realize that anger and lack of restraint are never the characteristics of power in political affairs, and they are rushing to exploit these aspects of weakness..For these reasons, the basic condition for successful dealing with Russia is that any foreign government (disagreement with Russia)) remains calm and strong at all times and to put its demands on Russian policy in a way that allows room for bargaining.Without harming the prestige of Russia.

Third

In light of the above, it will clearly become clear that the Soviet pressure on free institutions in the Western world is something that can be contained through the impartial and cautious application of the counter -power in a series of constantly changing geographical and political points, in a way that corresponds to the Soviet political transformations and maneuvers that cannot be implemented or prevented.The Russians are looking for an endless duel, and they see that they have already achieved great successes in it.In this regard, it should not be absent from the minds that the Communist Party was at one time representing a minority in Russian national life much greater than the minority represented by the Soviet power today in the world community.

But if the ideology is convinced of Russia's rulers that the truth lies in their ranks and that they are therefore able to wait, then those who do not call this ideology are freedom to examine the validity of this hypothesis objectively.The Soviet thesis not only suggests that the West completely lacks controlling its economic fate, but also assumes the continuation of Russian unity, discipline and patience for an endless period.Let's return this horrific vision to reality, and assume that the Western world has found the power and ability to contain the Soviet power over a period ranging between ten and 15 years..What will this mean to Russia itself?

The Soviet leaders have benefited from the contributions of modern technology in the arts of tyranny, and they found a solution to the issue of obedience within the limits of their authority.So their authority only challenges the few, and even those who do it, are unable to make this challenge valid against the repressive bodies of the state.

The Kremlin also proved his ability to achieve its purpose of building Russia, regardless of the interests of the population.He was constructed an industrial heavy mining basis, and it is certainly not complete, but it continues to grow and approach other major industrialized countries.However, preserving internal political security and building heavy industries has been done at a high cost in human life, hopes and energies, as this requires the use of forced labor on an unprecedented scale in the modern era in peace conditions.This work also involved neglecting or abusing other aspects of Soviet economic life, especially agriculture and the production of consumption, housing and transportation goods.

Moreover, the war added its huge losses of destruction, death and human fatigue.So, today there is a physical and spiritual stressful people in Russia.The hopes of the masses were disappointed and became skeptical and they did not return open as they were previously on the magic gravity that the Soviet power still radiates its followers abroad.The passion that people welcomed by eliminating restrictions on the church for tactical reasons during the war was a severe testimony of the fact that their ability to sincerity and dedication did not find a significant expression in the purposes of the regime.

In these circumstances, there are limits for the ability of the people themselves to endure physically and nervously, and these limits are absolute limits, and they are binding even to the harshest dictatorship, because people cannot push them beyond them.Forced work camps and other forced bodies provide temporary means to force people to work for longer hours than their will or simple economic pressure may dictate.And if people survive these circumstances, they become older..In both cases, their best powers are no longer available to society and it is no longer possible to recruit it in the service of the state.

At this moment, the assistant can only provide the younger generation, the largest and active generation despite all the fluctuations and suffering, and the Russians are a talented people.But it is unclear what the effects of mature performance of the abnormal emotional strains of the childhood created by the Soviet dictatorship, which increased tremendously due to the war..Things such as natural security and calm home environment have disappeared from being in practice in the Soviet Union outside the farms and remote villages, and the observers are not sure yet whether it will not leave its mark on the total ability of the next generation now on the stage of maturity.

In addition, the Soviet economic development, despite its achievement of some tremendous achievements, was intermittent and varying in anxious way.Therefore, Russian Communists who talk about "the unequal development of capitalism" should be ashamed to look at their national economy.Some branches of economic life, such as mining and mechanisms, have been developed completely far from other economies sectors.It is a nation that strives to become in a short period of one major industrialized countries in the world while it does not have a quick network worthy of this name and only has a relatively primitive rail network.A lot has been done to increase the efficiency of workers and teach primitive farmers how to run machines.But maintenance is still a big problem in the entire Soviet economy.Also, the construction is hasty and weak, and its value must be low.In large sectors of economic life, it was not yet possible to implant that general culture of production and self -esteem in an artistic way, as the skilled factor in the West distinguishes.

It is difficult to see how these shortcomings can be corrected early by a stressful and frustrated people that work largely in light of fear and coercion.And as long as it is not overcome, Russia will remain economically weak, and in some sense, a powerless country, capable of exporting its enthusiasm and promoting the strange attractiveness of its primitive political vitality, without the ability to support these exports with real evidence about material strength and prosperity.

Meanwhile, a great ambiguity of the political life of the Soviet Union, and this ambiguity surrounds the transfer of power from one individual or a group of individuals to others.

This, of course, is due to the problem of Stalin's personal position.It must be remembered that the succession of Lenin at the height of his superiority in the Communist movement was the only transition of the individual authority that the Soviet Union witnessed.This transition took 12 years to consolidate it, cost millions of people and destroy the foundations of the state.The global revolutionary movement felt the tremors accompanying this, which was not in favor of the Kremlin.

It is always possible that another transition to power from a prominent personality quietly occurs behind the limelight, without any repercussions anywhere.But in this case, the questions raised, if we use some Lenin's words, can lead to one of these "incredible rapid transformations" from "soft deception" to "unbridled violence" that distinguishes Russian history, and may destabilize the foundations of the Soviet power..

But this is not only Stalin's problem.Since 1938, there has been a disturbing clotting of political life in the upper circles of the Soviet Authority.The Soviet Conference for the General Union, which is the theory of the party's supreme body, was at least once every three years.But eight years have passed since the last meeting.During this period, the party's membership doubled numerically, and the party's deaths during the war were huge, and today more than half of the party members are people who joined the party since its last conference was held..Meanwhile, the small group of men continued at the top with a stunning series of national fluctuations.Certainly, there is a reason that made war experiences make basic political changes in all major Western governments.It is also certain that the reasons for this phenomenon are essential enough to be present somewhere in the corridors of Soviet political life as well..However, these issues did not have any recognition in Russia.

We must assume from this that even within a very disciplined institution like the Communist Party, there must be an increasing contrast, expectations and interests between the large bloc of the party members, who have been newly recruited in the movement, and the small group of men that reproduce itself at the top, which is thatMost party members have not met before, and they have not spoken to it before, and they could not have an intimate political relationship with it.

Who can say, in these circumstances, that the inevitable renewal of the levels of supreme power (which can be only a matter of time) can be done smoothly and peacefully, or whether the competitors in the search for a higher authority will not eventually communicate with these unpopular masses.And inexperienced in al -Qaeda in order to obtain support for their demands?If this happens at some time, it may have strange consequences for the Communist Party, in which membership activity is generally limited to discipline and strict obedience, not to the arts of settlement and compatibility.And if the division is controlled by the party and its iter, the chaos and weakness of Russian society will be exposed in indescribable forms, because we have seen that the Soviet power is only a peel that hides an inconsistent mass of humans that are not allowed to be allowed to any independent organizational structure.There is no so -called local government.Also, the current generation of the Russians never knew spontaneous teamwork.Consequently, if anything that destabilizes the unity and effectiveness of the party as a political tool, Soviet Russia may change overnight from one of the strongest national societies to one of the weakest and most prestigious national societies.

Consequently, the future of the Soviet power may not be safe in any way to the extent that Russia's ability to deceive it appears to the Kremlin men..They have proven that they can keep power for themselves, but their ability to hand them over to others should still be proven calmly and easily..Meanwhile, the difficulties of their rule and the fluctuations of international life have caused great damage to the strength and hopes of the great people to which their authority is based..It is strange to note that the ideological force of the Soviet power is the strongest today in areas outside the borders of Russia, out of reach of its police power.This phenomenon brings back to mind a comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel "Bodenbrok", as he noticed that human institutions often show their external genius when their internal decay is actually very advanced..The Bodenbrook family compared, in the days of its greatest luster, with one of those stars whose light shines strongly on this world after it has actually died for a long time..Who can say with confidence that the strong light that still casts the Kremlin on the people who are in place in the Western world is not that strong twilight of a group of stars whose light actually diminishes?This cannot be proven, as it cannot be refuted.But the possibility exists (and in the opinion of this writer is a strong possibility) that the Soviet power, like the capitalist world in its concept, carry within it the seeds of its decay, and that the growth of these seeds is well advanced.

Fourthly

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy an intimate political relationship with the Soviet regime.Therefore, it should continue to consider the Soviet Union as a rival and not a partner in the political arena.You must constantly expect that the Soviet policies will not reflect any passion for merely for peace and stability, nor any real belief in the possibility of permanent peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather you must expect cautious and continuous pressure in order to disrupt and weaken all the competing influence and competing forces.

However, the facts show that Russia, unlike the Western world in general, is still to a large extent the weakest party, and that the Soviet policy is very flexible, and that the Soviet society may contain shortcomings that will ultimately weaken its total capabilities.This in itself justifies the adoption of the United States with reasonable confidence, the firm containment policy, designed to confront the Russians with a counter -by -to -change with everywhere they show signs of infringement on the benefit of a world of peace and stability.

But in reality, the possibilities of American policy in any way are not limited to persistence in their position and hope for the best.It is completely possible for the United States to affect through its procedures in internal developments, whether inside Russia or through the international communist movement, through which Russian policy is largely identified..This is not only the issue of a modest measure of the information activity that this government can practice in the Soviet Union and anywhere, although this is also important..It is rather the issue of the extent of the United States’s ability to create an impression among the peoples of the world as a country that knows what it wants, and it successfully deals with the problems of its internal affairs and with the responsibilities of global power that enjoys spiritual vitality that is able to maintain its strength among the main ideological currents at that time.And if it succeeds in creating such an impression and preserving it, the goals of Russian communism will appear sterile and fictional, and the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow supporters will diminish, which will impose additional pressure on the external Kremlin policies, because the idea of the capitalist world's inability is the cornerstone of communist philosophy.Even the United States survived the consequences of the early economic depression that the Red Square crows expected with complete confidence since the turmoil will have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.

In the same way, the manifestations of hesitation, division and internal disintegration in this country have a joyful effect on the entire communist movement.At every manifestation of this situation, the Communist world sweeps a feeling of hope and excitement.A new pleasure can be seen in the corridors of Moscow, with new teams of foreign supporters joining what they can only see as the international politics train;Russian pressure increases in interfering on the international affairs line.

It would be an exaggeration that American behavior can without assistance and alone to exercise the power to control the fate of the Communist movement and to drop the Soviet power in Russia early..But the United States has the ability to increase the pressure on Soviet policy, and to impose a degree of moderation and caution on the Kremlin more than it was used to in recent years..In this way, it is possible to promote the tendencies that you must find a window in the end..Because no spiritual movement - struggle - especially the Kremlin movement - can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adapting to one way or another to the logic of that situation.

Consequently, the decision will significantly fall on this country itself.The issue of Soviet American relations is essentially a test of the total value of the United States as a nation among nations.To avoid destruction, the United States only needs to adhere to its best traditions and prove that it deserves to be preserved as a great country.

Certainly, there has never been a more fair test of national quality than this.In light of these circumstances, the dedicated observer of the Russian -American relations will not find any reason he calls to complain about the Kremlin challenge American society.Rather, he will feel some gratitude for the destiny that put the American people in front of this stubborn challenge, and made their comprehensive security as a nation hostage to their unity and their acceptance of the moral and political leadership responsibilities in which history has been clearly entrusted to history.

[1] "On the slogans of the United States of European", August 1915.The official Soviet edition of Lenin's works.

[2] The phrase "socialism" in this paper refers to Marxism or Leninist Communism, and not to liberal socialism of the second international type.

A group of articles published in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Averez