Russia's problem with Germany

As the Western-led system of global governance continues to erode, Germany's interests collide with Russia's goals to reset the balance of the international system and renegotiate European security arrangements agreed upon at the end of the Cold War. The book discusses the German-Russian relationship, and how to work to achieve balance despite the historical problems.

As an indispensable European power, Germany increasingly finds itself responsible for shaping Western policy toward Russia; America shrinks its role in European affairs in a world in which the West has lost significant moral authority over the past two decades. For Germany, which only regained full sovereignty in 1990 after forty-five years of post-war division, this is a very difficult task, made even more difficult by its deep and turbulent history with Russia.

Unlike Germany, Russia has not lost the art of strategic thinking. As a power sitting on the thrones of Europe and Asia, it has suffered for centuries from internal weakness linked to its size and economic backwardness. This has generated a great ability to harness its strengths and apply them to relationships with its powerful competitors. The success of the Putin administration in recent years in deploying Russian forces to Ukraine, Syria, and Libya reflects this, as well as its identification of divisions in Western societies and its willingness to capitalize on them. These efforts have taken Western countries by surprise, creating confusion and confused responses. The unconditional surrender and occupation in 1945 put an end to German strategic thinking and led to outsourcing from Washington; The Federal Republic took its place on the front line of Europe's defenses against the Soviet bloc. This did not prevent the Federal Republic of Germany from setting political goals, including reunification, but "grand strategy" was not its domain. Not surprisingly, Germany is now struggling to adapt to the game Russia is playing on a strategic level. For the Germans, the stunning end of the Cold War promised a different era; Where military power will be absent from European affairs in light of the harmony of common values ​​and interests.

Instead, Russia has used military force to shift borders, and Europe now finds itself without an effective arms control regime, and with a regime too weak to build trust to manage relations with Russia. The US withdrawal in 2019 from treaty arrangements limiting the deployment of US and Russia's intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe in response to Russian abuses was another sign of the deteriorating security system in Europe. Meanwhile, Germany has depleted its armed forces since the end of the Cold War, leaving it disorganized and ill-equipped to fully contribute to NATO's core mission of collective defence. Recently, the president of the Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, lamented Germany's current lack of a deterrent against countries like Russia, saying: “We are the masters of soft power. But soft power without hard power is like a football team without a goalkeeper.”

Russian-German sensitivities

This book, published by Manchester University Press in September 2021, examines the reasons for the challenge that Germany faces in formulating an effective policy towards Russia. The author argues that a complex mixture of cultural prejudices and sensitivities built up over centuries with Russia governs the way Germans view and interact with their country today. The German citizen...the feeling of guilt over Nazi crimes committed against the peoples of the Soviet Union cannot be erased.”

“Unlike the United States and even some of its European allies, Germany is interested in Russia,” he adds. History has given Germans a deep understanding of the importance of Europe's relationship with this vast country, at odds with its identity and Europeanness. The largest German embassy in the world is located in Moscow with large political and economic departments and a large military staff. It has more than thirty-five journalists accredited in Moscow, many of whom have extensive experience in the country. The world's largest Goethe-Institut is located in Moscow, the largest DEA support program is focused on Russia, and Germany has a good tradition of academic scholarships in Russia. But for more than twenty years, successive German governments have implemented highly consistent, but ineffective policies toward Moscow based on the belief that a combination of expanded economic relations and possible dialogue with government and society would help guide Russia along a path of reform that would lead to its acceptance by the family of nations. Like-minded European democracy.

The author finds that, in its relentless pursuit of strategic partnership, Germany inadvertently ended up supporting the emergence of a Russian regime hostile to its interests and values. In other words, its policy not only failed; Rather, it was counterproductive. It increasingly legitimized the Russian regime, encouraging it to project force against its neighbors and attack Western institutions. Of course. Germany was not alone in misreading Russia's development and facilitating the emergence of a regime in Russia willing and able to confront the West. The United Kingdom, for example, has also been playing an important enabling role for the Russian regime today by turning a blind eye to the origins of Russian money flowing into London.

Formulating a new policy with Russia

The Obama administration's reset policy toward Russia failed, because it was based on a misreading of Russian interests and motives. Many Western governments also believed that in the postmodern world, their interests were ultimately converged with those of Russia, and that Moscow believed in the same. In their view, this meant that they should be able to settle differences with Russia. However, in the case of Germany, its deep historical experience, knowledge of Russia and the many carefully nurtured contacts across many different sectors of Russian life by the late 1990s should have made clear that its approach was unrealistic and in need of change. Instead, Germany chose to remain in denial of Russia's direction until its annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Turning its back on Europe, Russia has moved closer to China and appears ready to accept being its junior partner in the absence of allies to counterbalance Chinese influence. The focus of the Russian leadership is on survival, and sees restoring and maintaining Russia's international standing as essential to the process of securing its rule, prioritizing it over the need to prepare Russia for a new economic and political era dominated by climate change, digitalization, and other disruptive forces. The rise of Asia, the confusion of the US with its allies, the smearing of Western values, and divisions in Western societies all offer short-term gains for a Russian leadership that fears reform at home but is confident in its own strength abroad. This encouraged an ill-considered policy toward Ukraine that could easily have led to a wider European conflict in 2014 when it annexed Crimea and deliberately destabilized southeastern Ukraine. In the process, Russia has made an enemy of a people with whom it shares a strong cultural affinity, cementing Ukraine's position as a political state, and it no longer sees its future in close alliance with Russia.

book structure

The first chapter of the book seeks to explain how Germany's historical legacy experience and attitudes toward Russia have shaped its political thinking since 1990 and continue to do so despite a sharp shift in response to Russia's actions in 2014.

Chapter Two looks at some of the main trends in German thinking about Russia over the centuries. Chapter Three considers the effect of German reunification on views of Russia, and explains how this miraculous result occurred more by chance than by a conscious policy of benevolence on the part of Moscow toward the Germans. Reunification is associated with a time when a reunited Germany appeared to be completely at peace with both its western and eastern neighbors and at peace with Russia. This was a luxurious version of Mikhail Gorbachev's "Common European House" that included the unexpected addition of NATO membership for all of Germany. Historically, these were the shortest and most unsustainable moments when the Soviet Union was in decline, on the verge of collapse and ready to make sacrifices in relations with the West to gain time. Even if Russia's current leaders do not follow the same logic and despise Gorbachev for allowing the Soviet Union to disintegrate, they are still happy that Germany feels obligated to Moscow to make reunification possible. The sentiment associated with this issue is another part of the historical conditioning of the Germans and provides a pressure point for Russia in its dealings with Germany.”

Chapter Four reviews Germany's policy toward Russia from 1990 to 2014 and shows how successive governments have stuck to the idea that Russia was a partner in Europe.

Chapter 5 analyzes Angela Merkel's recalibration of Russia policy in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine. With limited support from the Obama administration, Germany has demonstrated impressive leadership in the European Union by achieving consensus on the need for strong political support for Ukraine and the imposition of economic sanctions against Russia. The abandonment of previous orthodoxy in dealing with Russia was shocking to many, but it gained surprisingly broad public support, including from business. German policymakers cleverly formulated EU policy toward Russia, citing the spirit of the 1960s NATO Harmel Doctrine, which combined dialogue and deterrence as a prelude to détente.

Chapter Six reviews the economic relationship between Germany and Russia, and shows that even before the EU sanctions in 2014, it was underdeveloped and far less important to German business than is usually assumed. Here the author explains how the gas relationship has changed dramatically in recent years due to the European Union's success in forcing Gazprom to adapt its regulatory framework. This was a major irritant in the EU's relations with Russia and contributed to the breakdown of relations over Ukraine.

Chapter VII discusses the little-discussed issue of Russian influence in Germany. The country has long been a target of Russian “soft” power operations and espionage, but since 2014, it has seen the use of some “more difficult” new tools of influence, including disinformation and cyberattacks. For now, Russia appears content with the level of penetration of its "soft" power. The German debate on the topic has paid little attention to Russian influence through well-established networks in mainstream political parties as well as the business sector.

Chapter Eight looks at Germany's prospects for dealing with Russia against the backdrop of Russia's potential development as well as the factors influencing its view of Russia and the tools available to it to counter undesirable Russian behavior. The author believes that "it is necessary to invest more in defense after more than twenty-five years of reaping the fruits of peace." The concluding chapter argues that Germany must rediscover the ability to design strategy toward Russia. The author argues that to do so, policy makers must define policy objectives based on interests rather than emotions.